2004:

Even if electronic voting systems were perfect, we shouldn't use a mechanism that conceals the recording and counting of ballots -- because it invites fraud. Given that democracy relies on people's belief that elections are honest, we shouldn't turn over the heart of our elections to an unobservable, unverifiable mechanism.

Electronic voting systems without voter-verified paper ballots have never been proven to work (they can't be, because proof would require an independent audit of results, which requires voter-verified paper ballots). Without an independent audit of their results, no one can know if errors have occurred in recording or counting the votes. All we can see is whether or not the screen display appears correct -- visible malfunctions -- not what is going on inside, where most errors normally occur.

Computer errors are not just possible, they are guaranteed. In the professional world of computer technology, systems comparable to voting systems still produce errors after years of daily use, auditing, and corrections. In contrast, the hanging chads of Florida, 2000, were a blessing because anyone with normal vision could see the voter's intent by holding the ballot up to the light.

2009:

We now know that the paper trail idea has failed to work. It was good in theory, but not feasible in the real world.

This is why we must ban Direct Recording Electronic voting systems (DREs) that force voters to use computer touchscreens or pushbuttons to enter their votes. The replacement for such machines is the use of voter-marked paper ballots.

The votes on voter-marked paper ballots can be hand-counted at close of polls with continuous citizen observation and oversight of all procedures.

Alternatively the votes can be counted by scanners (electronic voting-counting systems). The use of scanners is acceptable to assist voters by checking for overvotes, but scanners are computers and their proper programming and function must be proven by recounts.

We have two problems in our nation regarding recounts to verify scanner function:

First is the widespread resistance to conducting recounts of scanner-processed ballots immediately upon close of polls.

Second, if recounts are conducted later, is the widespread resistance to maintaining citizen oversight of election-day materials between close of polls and the conduct of later recounts. Indeed, jurisdictions must demand that citizens show up and observe the entire chain of custody of all election-day materials (including voted and unvoted ballots, scanner memory cards, voter-sign-in books, etc) to prevent allegations of tampering that cannot be either proved or disproved.

Government behind closed doors is easily corrupted. That applies also to election procedures.